intelligence about improper approaches and liaising with the Anti
Security Managers could be drawn from a variety of backgrounds
including police, military, security and cricket.
116. After consultation within cricket, a sensible regime which
controls access to players on tour should become part of best
practice. This should be formalised through accreditation systems. The
mischief which must be stopped is the unrestricted access of potential
corruptors to dressing rooms, hotels, training grounds and other
venues in person or by telephone. If these practices are allowed to
continue the efforts to control malpractice will deserve to be
117. Similarly, after a brief period of consultation, a sensible
regime should be introduced to manage and restrict the use of mobile
telephones during international matches by players and others with
insider information to avoid the perception or reality of improper
release of information for betting purposes.
118. If commercial imperatives continue to take international
matches to neutral venues such as Sharjah, Canada, Singapore or
elsewhere the ICC must recognize that the relaxed carnival atmosphere
and the blurred regimes for payments and gifts provide an ideal venue
for improper approaches. Extra vigilance and security will be
necessary if these neutral venues continue to be used or expanded.
Conditions, Involvement and Obligations
variations in player conditions, remuneration, representation and
contractual obligations, whilst understandable, may have contributed
to temptation and malpractice. It is argued that jealousy, insecurity
and a potentially short international career have all added to the
temptation to be drawn into corruption. The cultural and commercial
differences within the member countries mitigate against a
comprehensive single response to this challenge. Nevertheless, a
number of improvements can and should be made.
120. The players are not sufficiently involved in the
administration of the game and ownership of the problems. There is
limited recognition of players representative bodies nationally and
internationally. Even after taking account of recent developments such
as the captains' meeting in Melbourne and the representation made by
the embryo organisation representing players internationally, there is
considerable scope for drawing players into a more productive
relationship with the ICC. Consideration should be given to enhancing
the role of the players and their representative bodies.
121. There should be a more consistent approach to players
contracts. Ideally there would be a single common form of contract
with common features including an obligation to comply with the latest
Code of Conduct of the ICC which was published in November 2000. In
the meantime the cricket boards who do not have a contractual
relationship with their players should give written notice to the ICC
that their players are aware of and bound by the Code of Conduct
published in November 2000.
122. The first round of self declaration forms, which gave the
players and others the opportunity to retrospectively report improper
approaches and behaviour, was well motivated but not worth the
logistical effort and outcome. The players obligations should be
reflected in their contracts, briefings and the work of the new
Security Managers. The self declaration process should not be
123. The current
situation with part time umpires, paid different rates of
remuneration, is recognised by the ICC as untenable longer term. The
ICC also has proposals for a Manager of umpires.
124. The ICC has already announced plans for an elite panel of full
time professional umpires, a Manager of umpires and proposals to
develop other umpires to new levels of expertise and professionalism.
These proposals should be implemented as soon as possible.
Investigation of Corruption
125. The Anti
Corruption Unit has been operational for seven months and its work has
confirmed the long history of corrupt practices within cricket. These
corrupt practices are now deeply ingrained in the operating culture of
cricket and in some cases may be linked to major criminals. It will
take a significant and long term effort to keep malpractice under
control and to reduce it to a minimal level. The Anti Corruption Unit,
with its current terms of reference, has made an important
contribution in scoping the scale of the problem, establishing a
database and supporting criminal investigations, judicial
investigations and special investigations. However, it requires
further change to build on these foundations. The ICC should also
review its policies on drug abuse within cricket.
126. The ICC must accept that anti corruption and security measures
are a necessary and long term requirement to be funded by the ICC.
127. The Anti Corruption Unit should be called the Anti Corruption
and Security Unit or just the Security Unit. This will reflect its
support for the new Security Manager posts. It will also utilise the
considerable experience within the unit in relation to security issues
generally. This will enable the unit to build on the vital anti
corruption work which will remain at the core of its activities.
128. The ICC should review its awareness and policies in relation
to unlawful use by players of performance enhancing drugs or other
unlawful use of drugs and issue guidelines and advice.
129. It was important to have a high profile Director to inaugurate
the work of the unit and I reaffirm my commitment to this task until
the completion of the 2003 World Cup. However, the key issue for the
ICC is that the work of this unit should be at the core of an
integrated process to combat malpractice. The Anti Corruption and
Security Unit should remain a small unit located in the same country
as the new Chief Executive of the ICC and with much stronger links to
the new Chief Executive on matters of strategy, budgets and personnel.
Strong links should also be established with the new Security Managers
(see recommendation no 6). Longer term the integrity of cricket will
be best served by processes enshrined in the running and
administration of the game. Less reliance should be placed on a
succession of outsiders brought in to deal with the problem as if it
is an ephemeral issue. As in comparative business organisations, the
Chief Executive and the Executive Board of the ICC should be held
accountable for their performance in combating malpractice.
130. Even though security and prevention of corruption should be an
important concern for the Chief Executive and Executive Board, the
operational independence of the Anti Corruption and Security Unit
should be preserved by it continuing to report to the Chairman of the
Code of Conduct Commission of the ICC on specific investigations.
131. The terms of reference of the unit should be reviewed and
redrafted to take account of the recommendations in this report and to
enable the unit to take on a more proactive role to prevent and detect
The Future of
132. Large sums of
money are now generated by the commercial activities of the individual
boards and the ICC centrally. As a result, a strong case is made for a
more coordinated and regulatory approach by the ICC. There is also a
need to develop the corporate governance of the ICC to match the
significant sums of money now available to develop world cricket. The
ICC will be in a stronger position if it continues to evolve from its
origins as a loose and fragile alliance into a modern regulatory body
whose role is clarified and whose transactions are more transparent
and accountable. The recommendations I have set out below will enhance
the reputation of the ICC and strengthen its moral and actual
authority to deal with corruption in world cricket.
133. The understandable and legitimate aspiration to minimise tax
obligations and the need to preserve commercial confidentiality in
business transactions should not be allowed to reach the point where
the ICC can be portrayed as a secretive and opaque organisation. The
ICC must become more open, transparent and accountable. Consideration
should be given to the publication of an annual report by the
President and Chief Executive. It should review the past year and
signpost future activity. Without breaching commercial confidentiality
it should detail how the ICC is using its considerable financial
resources to develop world cricket.
134. The large sums of money generated by the TV rights contracts
and the distribution of this money require commensurate auditing
processes. To avoid the perception or reality of misappropriation the
ICC should develop an internal audit function which matches the new
scale and risk of the commercial operations of the ICC.
135. The ICC has tried to address 'conflict of interest' issues for
those who serve on the Executive Board of the ICC. The matter has not
been resolved satisfactorily and needs to be revisited. It is very
much in the interest of world cricket to attract experienced
businessmen to serve on the Executive Board. However, the ICC must
face up to the role ambiguity of having people with business interests
linked to television serving on committees who award contracts for the
TV rights. It must also face up to the perceptions involved in
combining senior positions in cricket administration with personal
business interests in betting and gaming. The ICC should review its
policies and issue clear guidelines on 'conflict of interest' issues.
136. The ICC has an Ambassador programme designed to help develop
cricket in countries where the game is not a major sport. The ICC
should review the list of cricket ambassadors and remove from the list
any names which no longer seem compatible with the fight against
137. The ICC is at a
critical point of evolution. I encourage it to build on recent
developments and implement the programme of change set out in the
recommendations in this report.
138. The new Chief Executive should be given the authority and
responsibility to lead an implementation programme designed to put all
of the approved recommendations into full effect before the World Cup
in South Africa in the early part of 2003.
SIR PAUL CONDON QPM
INDEX OF APPENDICES
Appendix A - Copy of Self
Declaration Form 56
Appendix B - History of Investigations and Inquiries 58
Appendix C - Matches Mentioned in Official Inquiries 77
TO BE WRITTEN ON THE
HEADED NOTEPAPER OF THE BOARD OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY
Form of Declaration
This form applies to
every international player, to whom the ICC Code of Conduct applies,
involved in the playing of the game of cricket and is to be treated as
a supplement to any contract with your Board.
This form requires
you to declare in the interest of protecting the good name of cricket,
whether you have been approached to be involved in cricket corruption
in any form.
1. Have you taken
part in, or been approached to take part in, any arrangement with any
other person involved in the playing or administration of the game of
cricket which might involve corruption in any form?
2. Have you for
personal reward or for some other person's benefit agreed, or been
approached, in advance of or during a match to act in deliberate
breach of the Laws of Cricket, the ICC Standard Playing Conditions,
the ICC Code of Conduct or contrary to the spirit of the game of
3. Have you for
personal reward or for some other person's benefit agreed, or been
approached, to give information concerning the weather, the ground,
Team selection, the toss or the outcome of any match or any event in
the course of a match other than to a newspaper or broadcaster and
disclosed in advance to your Board?
4. Have you ever for
personal reward or for some other person's benefit, deliberately
played, or agreed to play or been approached to play, below your
normal standard, or encouraged any other person to play below his
normal standard, in order to contrive an event during the course of a
5. Have you for
personal reward or for some other person's benefit been involved, or
approached, in any attempt to pervert the normal outcome of a match?
Where an answer of
yes is given full details should be provided to Head of the
Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC.
I hereby declare
that I will not be involved in the future in any of the conduct
described above and I will immediately inform the Chief Executive of
my Board either directly or though the Team Manager and/or the Head of
the Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC if I receive any approach to be
involved in any such conduct.
NOTE - IF YOU
KNOWINGLY ANSWER ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS INCORRECTLY OR IF YOU FAIL TO
TELL THE HEAD OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION UNIT OF ICC OF ANY CHANGE TO YOUR
ANSWERS, YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO BE DISCIPLINED BY YOUR BOARD AND HEAVY
PENALTIES MAY APPLY
I HEREBY DECLARE
THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE GIVEN TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS ARE TRUE AND NOT
Name of player: (in CAPITALS)
OF INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES
In this Appendix to
the report I have summarised the chronology and outcome of
investigations into match fixing and related issues.
England 1994 -
Between 23rd and 26th August 1991 a match between Essex and Lancashire
resulted in a victory for Essex who subsequently won the County
Championship. On 25th August 1991 the match was interrupted when the
same teams met in the Sunday league contest, which resulted in
Lancashire winning and advancing within the competition.
In 1994 Don Topley,
who played for Essex in both the above matches, alleged in a British
newspaper that the outcome of both matches had been pre-determined by
the teams to ensure that both benefited from the outcome. An Inquiry
at the time by Lancashire, Essex and the Test and County Cricket Board
resulted in no action being taken against any person or team.
In 2000 the England
and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) passed the Topley papers to the Greater
Manchester Police. They concluded that no police action was warranted.
Subsequently the ECB announced that there was insufficient evidence
against any individual falling under the Boards jurisdiction to bring
a case before a discipline panel.
Sri Lanka 1994
– Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka
Early in 1994, following a tour in India, the Board of Control for
Cricket in Sri Lanka ordered an Inquiry into the national team's poor
performance. The tour had resulted in all three Tests being lost by an
innings. The report concluded, "There is evidence that a
bookmaker of Indian origin has attempted to make his presence felt in
the national cricket scene".
– Australian Cricket Board
In September 1994, during the Singer Cup in Sri Lanka, Mark Waugh and
Shane Warne accepted $4,000 and $5,000 respectively from 'John', an
Indian bookmaker, to provide him with weather and pitch information in
games involving Australia.
Waugh declined to provide details concerning team tactics or selection
of players but provided information to 'John' on approximately ten
occasions over a five month period. This included games in Pakistan,
Australia during the 1994/95 Ashes tour, in New Zealand in February
1995 and finally in the West Indies during the tour in 1995. the full
scope of Waugh's telephone calls were not fully appreciated until
further examination during the O'Regan Inquiry.
John gave Warne, who
had been introduced to Waugh, an envelope containing $5,000 as a token
of his appreciation for meeting him. Warne was subsequently phoned by
John on three occasions during the Ashes series in Australia 1994/95
and he responded in quite general terms to queries about the
composition of the team and the likely state of the pitch for certain
came to an end when a journalist contacted Ian McDonald, the
Australian Team Manager. Waugh and Warne provided McDonald with
handwritten, but unsigned statements (dated 20 February 1995)
concerning the acceptance of money from 'John'. After a further
interview with ACB officials, when both men again made admissions,
Waugh was fined $AUS 10,000 and Warne $AUS 8,000.
Other than a
reference to the incident in the Minutes of the ACB meeting of 28
February 1995, no mention of this incident was made public until 1998.
This would accord with the then feelings of the ICC that, in the best
interests of cricket, such matters should not be released into the
public domain. This incident is referred to in the O'Regan Report.
Pakistan 1995 –
Justice (Retd) Fakhruddin G Ibrahim
In 1995 the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) initiated an Inquiry,
under the chairmanship of Justice Fakhruddin G Ibrahim, a former judge
of the Pakistan Supreme Court, to look into allegations made by
Australian players surrounding the First Test between Pakistan and
Australia in Karachi in 1994 and the ODI in Rawalpindi
Some months after
the game a newspaper carried an article alleging that Salim Malik had
offered three Australian players (Shane Warne, Mark Waugh and Tim May)
$200,000 to manipulate the result during the last day of the fixture.
Waugh also alleged that Malik offered him $200,000 for four or five
Australian players to under- perform in the next days ODI in
The Inquiry was
frustrated as the Australian players did not travel to Pakistan to
give evidence, and thus the Inquiry had to rely on their statements
together with the cross examination of Malik.
In February 1995 the
International Cricket Council urged the Pakistan Cricket Board to be
discreet "always bearing in mind the damage to the image of
cricket if allegations were made public in any way".
In October 1995
Judge Ibrahim concluded the proceedings by saying "The
allegations against Saleem (sic) Malik are not worthy of any credence
and must be rejected as unfounded".
were re-examined during the O'Regan and Qayyum Inquiries.
India 1997 –
In 1997, following revelations in 'Outlook' magazine, the Honourable
Shri Justice Y. V. Chandrachud was appointed as a One Man Committee (Chandrachud Committee) by the Board of Control for Cricket in India
(BCCI) to hold an Inquiry into the alleged charges of betting and
match fixing by Indian cricketers and/or by the management.
The article alleged
that Manoj Prabhakar had been offered Rs. 25 lakhs (approx $53,000 at
current Indian Rupee/US dollar rate) by an Indian team member to
under- perform during the 1994 Singer Cup match between India and
Pakistan so as to favour Pakistan.
In November 1997
Justice Chandrachud, concluded his investigation. Whilst he accepted
that large scale betting occurred in India he was unwilling to accept,
upon the information provided to him, that there was proof that any
Indian player, official or journalist had ever involved themselves in
such a form of activity. This internal Inquiry was not to become
public for some two and a half years.
– O'Regan Inquiry
In 1998 after the 1994/95 Waugh and Warne allegations were revealed by
the media, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) faced criticism of the
handling of the affair. It responded by appointing Rob O'Regan AM QC
to conduct a full investigation covering the period January 1992 to
December 1998. His brief was to:
whether any of its contracted players had engaged in certain
conduct relating to betting, bribery, match-fixing, the
unauthorised receipt of moneys or other benefits and related
matters, and to investigate also disciplinary processes available
for consideration of such conduct.
As his was a private
ACB Inquiry, O'Regan did not have the powers conferred by statute to
compel witnesses to give evidence on oath or affirmation, nor could he
even require them to give evidence at all. The Inquiry did not enjoy
the protection of absolute privilege, such as would provide a complete
defence against an action in defamation.
his examination on the events surrounding Australian players in
- Alleged approach
to Dean Jones during 1992 in Sri Lanka.
- Allegation that
the second match of the 1992 World XI v Indian XI was fixed.
- Allegations that
Allan Border was approached to fix the final Test of the 1993
Australian tour of England.
- The acceptance of
$4,000 and $5,000 by Mark Waugh and Shane Warne during the 1994
Sri Lanka/Pakistan Tour
- Alleged approach
to Ricky Ponting for match information during 1997
- Alleged approach
to Mark Taylor regarding weather and pitch information during the
1998 Pakistan tour.
After a thorough
investigation O'Regan formed the opinion that there was no basis for
recommending disciplinary action against any Australian player, Waugh
and Warne having previously been fined in 1995. However he did
criticise the ACB for its handling of the Waugh/Warne case believing
that they should have been suspended.
He recommended that
the ACB review the way in which it dealt with serious disciplinary
proceedings, publicity of such proceedings, penalties to be imposed
and player counselling in relation to untoward contact with those with
Some of the events
mentioned in the O'Regan report were later to be corroborated by the
Indian bookmaker MK Gupta, when he was interviewed by the Indian
Central Bureau of Investigation in 2000 during the Hansie Cronjé
affair. However the evidence of Gupta made a new allegation of
corruption against one Australian player. This allegation is currently
the subject of an investigation by the Special Investigator appointed
by the ACB, with assistance from the ICC ACU.
Pakistan 1998 –
In 1998, under the terms of the Commission of Inquiry Act 1956,
Pakistan set up a one man Judicial Commission to probe allegations
that members of the National team had been involved in betting and
match fixing. Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Qayyum was appointed to the
This was to follow
the Inquiry undertaken by Justice (Retd.) Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim and a
Probe Committee Inquiry chaired by Justice Ejaz Yousef (Yousef
Inquiry). The Yousef Inquiry, which did not have the powers of a Judge
to compel witnesses to give evidence, was undertaken ex-parte and no
opportunity was given to the accused to be represented or
cross-examine witnesses. Whilst the Yousef Inquiry was abandoned, as
it was felt that the process was flawed, it had tentatively suggested
that certain players be suspended from playing cricket.
decided that rules of natural justice such as hearing and right of
cross-examination must be applied.
- To probe into the
allegations regarding betting and match fixing against the members
of the Pakistan Cricket Team.
- To determine and
identify the persons including members of the team responsible for
betting and match fixing.
- To recommend such
actions as may be appropriate; and
- To suggest
measures to avoid any future incidence.
'match-fixing' was defined as:
- Deciding the
outcome of a match before it is played and then playing oneself or
having others play below one's/their ability to influence the
outcome to be in accordance with the pre-decided outcome. Match
fixing was undertaken primarily for pecuniary gain.
As Justice Qayyum
considered that the appropriate punishments for match-fixing was a ban
he required the burden of proof to lie between that applied to the
criminal and normal civil standard, i.e. a higher standard of proof
than the balance of probabilities.
Two offences were
- Bringing the name
of the team into disrepute (match-fixing related)
examined cricketers from Pakistan and Australia, Sports Journalists
and miscellaneous other witnesses, and heard evidence containing fact
and conjecture relating to incidents of alleged betting and match
fixing. Whilst many events were related, it soon became apparent that
Salim Malik was the focal point of many of the allegations.
Amongst those who
appeared to give evidence were Mark Waugh and Mark Taylor. They gave
evidence of an approach by Malik shortly before the Wills Triangular
Series ODI in Rawalpindi on 22 October 1994 when Malik sought out
Waugh to enquire if he could influence the Australian team in throwing
However, whilst not
specifically asked about it, they did not mention the undisclosed ACB
1995 finding that Waugh and Warne had accepted money from an Indian
bookmaker, a fact to which Taylor had also been privy. This was
revealed in December 1998, after they had given evidence before
Justice Qayyum. As a direct result of this disclosure the Qayyum
Inquiry travelled to Australia, where a special hearing having been
convened under Pakistan law, they heard from Waugh and Warne.
many months earlier, and submitted to the PCB, Justice Qayyums report
was not published until after the publicity surrounding the
revelations about Cronjè.
In the report he
concluded "The allegation that the Pakistan team as a whole is
involved in match-fixing is just based on allegation, conjectures and
surmises without there being positive proof. As a whole, the players
of the Pakistan Cricket team are innocent".
However he found
that the evidence in the case of Salim Malik was such that he should
be banned from cricket for life and that there should be an inquiry
into his assets. He further recommended that Ata-ur-Rehman should be
similarly banned for life. Additionally Wasim Akram, Mushtaq Ahmed,
Waqar Younis, Inzamam-ul-Haq, Akram Raza, Basit Ali and Saeed Anwar
were subject of various penalties including being warned, censured,
further investigated or kept under observation. He also recommended
that the captaincy of the Pakistan Cricket team be removed from Wasim
He also imposed
fines of varying amounts as follows: Salim Malik Rs. 10 lac Wasim
Akram Rs. 3 lac Mushtaq Ahmad Rs. 3 lac Ata-ur-Rehman Rs. 1 lac Waqar
Younis Rs. 1 lac Inzamam-ul-Haq Rs. 1 lac Akram Raza Rs. 1 lac Saeed
Anwar Rs. 1 lac
At the current
Rupee/US Dollar exchange rate, one 1 Lac (100,000 Pakistan Rupees)
equates to approximately $ 1,640.
considered that the PCB should enforce declarations of assets by all
its players and, if necessary, initiate a probe into their accounts. A
watchdog Review Committee should be formed to deal with any future
A series of
recommendations were made to prevent match fixing in the future. They
can be summarised as covering areas surrounding,
- The character of
the team Manager and Captain
- Independent team
ombudsman of foreign tours
- A new code of
- Increase in
players pay and conditions
- Education of
players concerning entrapment by bookmakers
- Enforcement of
strict discipline with a zero tolerance approach
- Review of match
relations with the press and match day restrictions
England 1999 –
Metropolitan Police investigation
In late July 1999 Stephen Fleming, the New Zealand Captain, was
approached in his hotel in Leicester, UK by two Indian nationals who
allegedly propositioned him to 'fix' the 3rd Test between England and
New Zealand due to take place at Old Trafford, Manchester on 5th
August. He rejected the proposition and reported the matter to his
A day or so later
Chris Lewis, the former England international, was similarly
approached by two Indian nationals with a view to him arranging to
'fix' the 3rd Test or alternatively future matches involving the
England team. He rejected the offer and the incident was reported to
the England and Wales Cricket Board and the Metropolitan Police,
London. A criminal investigation was initiated and police interviewed
various people alleged to be involved in the corrupt approach. During
the course of enquiries the Metropolitan Police have liaised with the
New Delhi Police, CBI and the King Commission in developing links
between the various allegations of corruption.
The result of the
investigation has been passed to the UK judicial authorities for
India 2000 –
New Delhi Police investigation
In April 2000, whilst investigating an unrelated matter, New Delhi
Police were monitoring the telephone calls of an Indian national. They
overheard a telephone conversation in which Hansie Cronjé was
mentioned, and subsequently listened to him discussing match fixing.
The New Delhi Police
launched an investigation centred on the association between Cronjé
(and South African players), London based businessman Sanjay Chawla
and two Indian bookmakers. In May 2000 the New Delhi Police charged
Cronjé, Strydom, Gibbs and Bojé, in their absence, with cheating,
fraud and criminal conspiracy.
India 2000 –
Following the investigation by the New Delhi Police, which revealed
that Cronjé had taken money from Indian bookmakers the Central Bureau
of Investigation (CBI) instigated an inquiry.
inquiries, the CBI (whose investigations commenced in May 2000)
actively sought out evidence, in contrast to hearing witnesses in a
formal enquiry. They also utilised itemised telephone billing to prove
associations. The CBI decided that first of all a broad enquiry was to
be made to ascertain whether match fixing and other malpractices
connected with the game of cricket existed. Accordingly, the following
were fixed as focal points:
The CBI focused on the following:
- Identification of
the betting syndicates operating in India and examine their
- Unraveling of the
linkages of cricket players or their intermediaries with these
syndicates and their roles in the alleged malpractices; and
- Examination of
the role and functions of Board of Control for Cricket in India so
as to evaluate whether it could have prevented the alleged
The CBI, like Qayyum, provided a definition of match fixing, which they interpreted
- Instances where
an individual player or group of players received money
individually/collectively to under-perform;
- Instances where a
player placed bets in matches in which he played that would
naturally undermine his performance;
- Instances where
players passed on information to a betting syndicate about team
composition, probable result, pitch condition, weather, etc.,
- Instances where
grounds men were given money to prepare a pitch in a way which
suited the betting syndicate; and
Instances of current
and ex-players being used by bookies to gain access to Indian and
foreign players to influence their performance for a monetary
The revelations about Cronjé, which will be referred to within the
section relating to the King Commission, ultimately led to Mukesh
Kumar Gupta (also known as MK and John), an Indian bookmaker. Gupta,
who was one of many bookmakers and gamblers interviewed by the CBI,
was the only one to admit to corrupting cricket players of various
countries. He alleged he had paid players significant amounts of money
for under-performing and match information
found that MK Gupta had become involved in illegal betting in the
1980's and in 1988 paid Ajay Sharma 2,000 rupees, having watched him
play, as a token of his appreciation. Subsequently through Sharma, and
later Manoj Prabhakar, Gupta alleged that he met many Indian and
foreign international players. He gave evidence of large-scale
corruption involving, amongst others, Azharuddin and Cronjé. He also
named several non Indian players and alleged that they had been
involved in cricket malpractice. The CBI did not have the jurisdiction
to investigate the non- Indian players and although they named them in
their report they did not carry out any investigation into these
evidence from players, officials, bookmakers, gamblers and others, the
CBI commented that " At the very outset that the cricketing
fraternity, generally speaking, maintained a 'conspiracy of silence'
and were rarely forthcoming with any specific information relevant to
the enquiry. Not a single player/ex-player/official etc., other than
those who had made vague and general allegations in the media,
volunteered any information to the CBI".
The CBI Report,
published in November 2000, implicated Indian players, and officials,
and non-Indian players. It also criticised the BCCI. The Solicitor
General of India was in broad agreement with the findings of the CBI
that no criminal charges could be filed against anyone.
The CBI criticised
the Board of Control for Cricket in India for being negligent in
response to allegations of match fixing and also criticised its
structure and accountability. The Board has challenged these
publication of the CBI Report the BCCI appointed Mr K. Madhaven to
review the finding of the report and conduct inquiries on behalf of
the BCCI with regard to Indian players and officials. On 5 December
2000, after Mr Madhaven had submitted his findings, the BCCI banned
Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma for life from playing any cricket
matches conducted or authorised by the ICC/BCCI or affiliated
association. Manoj Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and Dr Ali Irani were banned
for 5 years in similar terms.
The CBI Report
concluded that whilst small scale betting on cricket matches had been
taking place in India for a long time, the advent of live television
broadcasts led to an upswing in large scale betting. This coincided
with India's victory in the 1983 World Cup. The CBI linked the current
sophisticated nature and monetary scale of betting in India to
organised crime with clear signals of 'Mafia' underworld involvement.
South Africa 2000
– King Commission
Following the Cronjé revelations, and his subsequent confession to
officials of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB), the
authorities set up an Inquiry chaired by Judge Edwin King.
The Commission was
established by the President of South Africa in terms of Section
84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (Act No
108 of 1996) as a Commission of Inquiry into Cricket Match Fixing and
Related Matters (commonly referred to as the King Commission).
The Terms of
Reference for the preliminary investigation were:
A.1. The disclosures
made by the former South African cricket captain, Hansie Cronjé, that
during the Triangular Tournament between South Africa, England and
Zimbabwe in January and February 2000, he received payment of
approximately $10,000-00 from a bookmaker.
A.2. Whether during
the period 1 November 1999 – 17 April 2000, and excluding the
matters referred to in paragraph 1, any member of the South African
cricket team or team official received or was promised payment of any
amount of money or other benefit (excluding salary, emoluments,
sponsorship and other payments or benefits lawfully connected
therewith) in relation to his or her functions as a member of the
South African cricket team or as a team official.
A.3. Whether a
proposal was made to the South African cricket team during its tour to
India in 1996 that it forfeit or otherwise influence the result of a
The Commission heard
that on 7th April 2000 the UCB first became aware of allegations that
Hansie Cronjé had been involved in match fixing, although it did not
define its interpretation of match fixing. After initial denials to
the UCB, Cronjé confessed to accepting money from bookmaker Sanjay
Chawla for involvement in cricket malpractice involving the South
African Team. Cronjè had been introduced to Chawla by South African
based bookmaker Hamid Cassim.
revealed that Cronjé had approached several South African players in
an apparently light hearted and jocular manner suggesting that money
could be made by fixing the results of games. This was his way of
sounding out his colleagues. In the main this was laughed off, but
Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams were later to be embroiled in
During the CBI
investigation Azharuddin had admitted that in December 1996 he had
introduced Cronjé to the bookmaker M K Gupta during the South African
tour to India. Gupta immediately propositioned Cronjé, who accepted
$30,000 to ensure that South Africa lost the Third Test commencing the
following day. Cronjé stated that he had subsequently done nothing to
influence the outcome of this match, which India won.
About the same time
Gupta made an offer to Cronjé for South Africa to lose a One Day
International, initially being played for the benefit of Mohinder
Amarnath, but subsequently converted into an official international
several members of the South African Team and mentioned that he had
received the offer that was dependant on the team playing badly in the
ODI. The offer was reportedly in the region of $200,000 – $250,000
and Cronjé was later to indicate that the offer had been raised by
$100,000. Following meetings, involving senior members and the team as
a whole, the offer was rejected.
ended in November 1997 after Cronjé rejected Gupta's corrupt
proposals during the quadrangular series.
With Gupta off the
scene it is alleged that in January 2000 Cronjé influenced the result
of the 5th Test against England at Centurion Park. After the first
days play, when South Africa was 155 for 6 at the close of play, days
two, three and four had been affected by the weather. On the evening
of the penultimate day's play Cronjé spoke to Marlon Aronstam, who
was well versed in sports betting, who urged him to 'make a game of
it'. On the last day it was agreed that South Africa would declare and
leave England with a 'run race', a feat that they achieved. Aronstam
had reportedly agreed to make a donation of R200,000 to a charity of
Cronjé's choice (although Cronjé recalls the figure to be R500,000)
if he could ensure a positive result for the fixture. At the current
Rand/US Dollar exchange rate, R200,000 equates to approximately
$24,000 and R500,000 to approximately $ 60,000.
testified that he had paid Cronjé R50,000 as an advance for future
cooperation in relation to pitch reports.
The UCB subsequently
banned Cronjé for life. On 28 August 2000 Gibbs and Williams were
banned from international cricket for six months (ending 1 January
2001) and fined R60,000 and R10,000 respectively for accepting a
$15,000 bribe offered by Cronjé to under-perform in an ODI at Nagpur
earlier that year. However Gibbs and Williams were permitted to
continue playing domestic cricket.
The First Interim
Report of the Commission detailing the evidence of Cronjé was
published in August 2000.
One of the Commission's duties was to make recommendations concerning
the various matters falling within its mandate.
On 14 December 2000,
although his work continued, Judge King completed his second Interim
Report with his recommendations. These fell under the broad headings
- Control and
- Punishment and
Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates had been mentioned during various
Inquiries as a venue where match fixing occurred. In January 2001 the
Emirates Cricket Board commissioned a private Inquiry, under the
chairmanship of the George W Staple CB QC, to examine allegations that
directly impinged upon Sharjah as a venue. The Commission of Inquiry,
which also included the former West Indian Captain Clive Lloyd and
Brigadier Mohammed K Al Mualla, submitted its confidential interim
report to the Emirates Cricket Board in April 2001.
ACCESS TO REPORTS
This document, whilst giving the reader a flavour of the various
Inquiries and Reports, does not pretend to encompass all matters that
were subject of inquiry or investigation. Full copies of the Reports
may be found at the following web site addresses:
Commission Report – 1st Interim
Commission Report – 2nd Interim
The table at
Appendix 'C' provides details of matches mentioned by players,
administrators, team officials, journalists or bookmakers during the
CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K) inquiries in India, Pakistan and South
Whilst the above
information has been compiled from a variety of sources, assistance
and copyright material provided by Wisden Cricketers' Almanack and
CricInfo is gratefully acknowledged.
MATCHES MENTIONED IN
matches were mentioned by players, administrators, team officials,
journalists or bookmakers during the CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K)
inquiries in India, Pakistan and South Africa. Inclusion on this list
does not necessarily indicate that a match was fixed.
World Cup match.
||1981 p. 1012
||1988 p. 283
||1992 p. 1160
XI v Habib Bank
India games in B&H
World Series in Australia
||1993 p. 303
||1994 p. 972
||1994 p. 978
||1994 p. 980
||1994 p. 981
||India v Sri
||1995 p. 1091
||1995 p. 1107
||1995 p. 1112
||1995 p. 1172
||1996 p. 1138
||Sri Lanka v
||1996 p. 1141
||1996 p. 1030
||1996 p. 1147
||India v West
||1996 p. 1152
||1996 p. 1177
||1996 p. 1178
||1997 p. 1043
||1997 p. 1175
||1998 p. 1037
v South Africa
||1998 p. 1156
||1998 p. 1158
||1998 p. 1049
||1998 p. 1050
||1998 p. 1054
||1998 p. 1081
||1998 p. 1082
||1998 p. 1084
||1998 p. 1118
||Sri Lanka v
||1999 p. 1171
||1999 p. 1176
||1999 p. 1182
||1999 p. 1083
||1999 p. 1194
||1999 p. 1212
||India v New
||1999 p. 1240
||1999 p. 411
||2000 p. 1281
||2000 p. 1289
||2000 p. 445
||2000 p. 471
||2000 p. 478
Series between India, India A and India B
v New Zealand
||2001 p. 1113
||2001 p. 1077
series between South Africa, England and Zimbabwe
||2001 p. 1196
||2001 p. 1198
||2001 p. 1202
Reproduced from Wisden Cricketers' Almanack 2001 by kind permission of
John Wisden & Co Ltd.
© ICC 2001