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106. Earlier in this report, I described the history of corruption in cricket and the reasons why it has flourished. I also reported that I believe occurrence and match fixing are still taking place. In this section of the report I set out a number of interlinked recommendations which, if implemented, will give the ICC and the national cricket boards a much stronger ability to deal with the challenge which still has the potential to undermine confidence in world cricket. In putting forward these recommendations I have drawn on the work of the ACU and on the findings and recommendations of the inquiries set out in appendix B.

Education and Awareness

107. Ignorance of the risk and actuality of corruption in cricket have enabled malpractice to spread and flourish. I have spoken to mature and worldly wise players, umpires and administrators who were genuinely unaware of the corrupt practices until the revelations in recent years. There is a compelling case and acceptance for a programme of education and awareness training.

108. The ICC should develop and implement a comprehensive training and awareness programme designed to raise awareness of the risks of corruption in cricket and the methods used to entice players and others into malpractice. It should also emphasise the resolve of the ICC to deal with the problem and to punish wrongdoers.

109. An education programme will only be effective if it is professional, embraces all member countries and is ongoing. Whilst respecting national, cultural and religious differences, the ICC should produce training material that can be utilised in all the member countries with a consistent and enduring series of messages.

110. Best practice in major sports in the United States of America has shown the value of a professionally made video being at the core of a training programme to deter corruption. American football, basketball, baseball and the ice hockey authorities use a video commissioned by them. The ICC should commission a professionally made video for use in cricket. Such a video would be strengthened by the inclusion of disgraced cricketers relaying their experiences to deter others.

111. As well as raising awareness of the problem, the programme should encourage the reporting of improper approaches and engender confidence that the ICC does want to confront the problem. The video should be reinforced and supported by posters and other literature.


112. The training and awareness programme should target all international players, umpires and other relevant people in cricket. It should include all representative national teams from the youngest age group upwards. Beyond that consideration should be given to making sensible links with cricket academies and the domestic game within the individual countries.

Security and Control

113. Corruptors have gained access to players and others with consummate ease. The absence of even the most basic regime of accreditation on tours has allowed undesirable people to mix freely with players and has provided the breeding ground for improper approaches and corruption. A balance must be struck between the needs for privacy, a social life and the ambassadorial role of players on the one hand and on the other the need to create a viable regime of security and control. Consultation should take place and notice taken of the good practice which is being developed in some countries. I have set out below a package of measures designed to incorporate best practice and promote a sensible regime of security and control.


114. Each full member country of the ICC should appoint a full time Security Manager. They should be recruited locally and employed by the National Boards but work to a broadly similar job description. If necessary, they should be funded centrally by the ICC. Their job description will include:

  • Providing advice and action in relation to the security of players, officials and venues
  • Preventing and detecting improper approaches to players on tour
  • Collating intelligence about improper approaches and liaising with the Anti Corruption Unit.

    115. The Security Managers could be drawn from a variety of backgrounds including police, military, security and cricket.

    116. After consultation within cricket, a sensible regime which controls access to players on tour should become part of best practice. This should be formalised through accreditation systems. The mischief which must be stopped is the unrestricted access of potential corruptors to dressing rooms, hotels, training grounds and other venues in person or by telephone. If these practices are allowed to continue the efforts to control malpractice will deserve to be ridiculed.

    117. Similarly, after a brief period of consultation, a sensible regime should be introduced to manage and restrict the use of mobile telephones during international matches by players and others with insider information to avoid the perception or reality of improper release of information for betting purposes.

    118. If commercial imperatives continue to take international matches to neutral venues such as Sharjah, Canada, Singapore or elsewhere the ICC must recognize that the relaxed carnival atmosphere and the blurred regimes for payments and gifts provide an ideal venue for improper approaches. Extra vigilance and security will be necessary if these neutral venues continue to be used or expanded.

    Player Conditions, Involvement and Obligations

    119. Significant variations in player conditions, remuneration, representation and contractual obligations, whilst understandable, may have contributed to temptation and malpractice. It is argued that jealousy, insecurity and a potentially short international career have all added to the temptation to be drawn into corruption. The cultural and commercial differences within the member countries mitigate against a comprehensive single response to this challenge. Nevertheless, a number of improvements can and should be made.

    120. The players are not sufficiently involved in the administration of the game and ownership of the problems. There is limited recognition of players representative bodies nationally and internationally. Even after taking account of recent developments such as the captains' meeting in Melbourne and the representation made by the embryo organisation representing players internationally, there is considerable scope for drawing players into a more productive relationship with the ICC. Consideration should be given to enhancing the role of the players and their representative bodies.

    121. There should be a more consistent approach to players contracts. Ideally there would be a single common form of contract with common features including an obligation to comply with the latest Code of Conduct of the ICC which was published in November 2000. In the meantime the cricket boards who do not have a contractual relationship with their players should give written notice to the ICC that their players are aware of and bound by the Code of Conduct published in November 2000.

    122. The first round of self declaration forms, which gave the players and others the opportunity to retrospectively report improper approaches and behaviour, was well motivated but not worth the logistical effort and outcome. The players obligations should be reflected in their contracts, briefings and the work of the new Security Managers. The self declaration process should not be repeated.


    123. The current situation with part time umpires, paid different rates of remuneration, is recognised by the ICC as untenable longer term. The ICC also has proposals for a Manager of umpires.

    124. The ICC has already announced plans for an elite panel of full time professional umpires, a Manager of umpires and proposals to develop other umpires to new levels of expertise and professionalism. These proposals should be implemented as soon as possible.

    Prevention and Investigation of Corruption

    125. The Anti Corruption Unit has been operational for seven months and its work has confirmed the long history of corrupt practices within cricket. These corrupt practices are now deeply ingrained in the operating culture of cricket and in some cases may be linked to major criminals. It will take a significant and long term effort to keep malpractice under control and to reduce it to a minimal level. The Anti Corruption Unit, with its current terms of reference, has made an important contribution in scoping the scale of the problem, establishing a database and supporting criminal investigations, judicial investigations and special investigations. However, it requires further change to build on these foundations. The ICC should also review its policies on drug abuse within cricket.

    126. The ICC must accept that anti corruption and security measures are a necessary and long term requirement to be funded by the ICC.

    127. The Anti Corruption Unit should be called the Anti Corruption and Security Unit or just the Security Unit. This will reflect its support for the new Security Manager posts. It will also utilise the considerable experience within the unit in relation to security issues generally. This will enable the unit to build on the vital anti corruption work which will remain at the core of its activities.

    128. The ICC should review its awareness and policies in relation to unlawful use by players of performance enhancing drugs or other unlawful use of drugs and issue guidelines and advice.

    129. It was important to have a high profile Director to inaugurate the work of the unit and I reaffirm my commitment to this task until the completion of the 2003 World Cup. However, the key issue for the ICC is that the work of this unit should be at the core of an integrated process to combat malpractice. The Anti Corruption and Security Unit should remain a small unit located in the same country as the new Chief Executive of the ICC and with much stronger links to the new Chief Executive on matters of strategy, budgets and personnel. Strong links should also be established with the new Security Managers (see recommendation no 6). Longer term the integrity of cricket will be best served by processes enshrined in the running and administration of the game. Less reliance should be placed on a succession of outsiders brought in to deal with the problem as if it is an ephemeral issue. As in comparative business organisations, the Chief Executive and the Executive Board of the ICC should be held accountable for their performance in combating malpractice.

    130. Even though security and prevention of corruption should be an important concern for the Chief Executive and Executive Board, the operational independence of the Anti Corruption and Security Unit should be preserved by it continuing to report to the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Commission of the ICC on specific investigations.

    131. The terms of reference of the unit should be reviewed and redrafted to take account of the recommendations in this report and to enable the unit to take on a more proactive role to prevent and detect corruption.

    The Future of the ICC

    132. Large sums of money are now generated by the commercial activities of the individual boards and the ICC centrally. As a result, a strong case is made for a more coordinated and regulatory approach by the ICC. There is also a need to develop the corporate governance of the ICC to match the significant sums of money now available to develop world cricket. The ICC will be in a stronger position if it continues to evolve from its origins as a loose and fragile alliance into a modern regulatory body whose role is clarified and whose transactions are more transparent and accountable. The recommendations I have set out below will enhance the reputation of the ICC and strengthen its moral and actual authority to deal with corruption in world cricket.

    133. The understandable and legitimate aspiration to minimise tax obligations and the need to preserve commercial confidentiality in business transactions should not be allowed to reach the point where the ICC can be portrayed as a secretive and opaque organisation. The ICC must become more open, transparent and accountable. Consideration should be given to the publication of an annual report by the President and Chief Executive. It should review the past year and signpost future activity. Without breaching commercial confidentiality it should detail how the ICC is using its considerable financial resources to develop world cricket.

    134. The large sums of money generated by the TV rights contracts and the distribution of this money require commensurate auditing processes. To avoid the perception or reality of misappropriation the ICC should develop an internal audit function which matches the new scale and risk of the commercial operations of the ICC.

    135. The ICC has tried to address 'conflict of interest' issues for those who serve on the Executive Board of the ICC. The matter has not been resolved satisfactorily and needs to be revisited. It is very much in the interest of world cricket to attract experienced businessmen to serve on the Executive Board. However, the ICC must face up to the role ambiguity of having people with business interests linked to television serving on committees who award contracts for the TV rights. It must also face up to the perceptions involved in combining senior positions in cricket administration with personal business interests in betting and gaming. The ICC should review its policies and issue clear guidelines on 'conflict of interest' issues.

    136. The ICC has an Ambassador programme designed to help develop cricket in countries where the game is not a major sport. The ICC should review the list of cricket ambassadors and remove from the list any names which no longer seem compatible with the fight against corruption.

    Implementation of Recommendations

    137. The ICC is at a critical point of evolution. I encourage it to build on recent developments and implement the programme of change set out in the recommendations in this report.

    138. The new Chief Executive should be given the authority and responsibility to lead an implementation programme designed to put all of the approved recommendations into full effect before the World Cup in South Africa in the early part of 2003.



    Appendix A - Copy of Self Declaration Form 56
    Appendix B - History of Investigations and Inquiries 58
    Appendix C - Matches Mentioned in Official Inquiries 77

    Appendix 'A' 




    Form of Declaration

    This form applies to every international player, to whom the ICC Code of Conduct applies, involved in the playing of the game of cricket and is to be treated as a supplement to any contract with your Board.

    This form requires you to declare in the interest of protecting the good name of cricket, whether you have been approached to be involved in cricket corruption in any form.

    1. Have you taken part in, or been approached to take part in, any arrangement with any other person involved in the playing or administration of the game of cricket which might involve corruption in any form?

    2. Have you for personal reward or for some other person's benefit agreed, or been approached, in advance of or during a match to act in deliberate breach of the Laws of Cricket, the ICC Standard Playing Conditions, the ICC Code of Conduct or contrary to the spirit of the game of cricket

    3. Have you for personal reward or for some other person's benefit agreed, or been approached, to give information concerning the weather, the ground, Team selection, the toss or the outcome of any match or any event in the course of a match other than to a newspaper or broadcaster and disclosed in advance to your Board?

    4. Have you ever for personal reward or for some other person's benefit, deliberately played, or agreed to play or been approached to play, below your normal standard, or encouraged any other person to play below his normal standard, in order to contrive an event during the course of a match? YES/NO

    5. Have you for personal reward or for some other person's benefit been involved, or approached, in any attempt to pervert the normal outcome of a match?

    Where an answer of yes is given full details should be provided to Head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC.

    I hereby declare that I will not be involved in the future in any of the conduct described above and I will immediately inform the Chief Executive of my Board either directly or though the Team Manager and/or the Head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC if I receive any approach to be involved in any such conduct.



    Dated: ______________2001
    Name of player: (in CAPITALS)

    Appendix 'B'


    In this Appendix to the report I have summarised the chronology and outcome of investigations into match fixing and related issues.

    England 1994 - Don Topley
    Between 23rd and 26th August 1991 a match between Essex and Lancashire resulted in a victory for Essex who subsequently won the County Championship. On 25th August 1991 the match was interrupted when the same teams met in the Sunday league contest, which resulted in Lancashire winning and advancing within the competition.

    In 1994 Don Topley, who played for Essex in both the above matches, alleged in a British newspaper that the outcome of both matches had been pre-determined by the teams to ensure that both benefited from the outcome. An Inquiry at the time by Lancashire, Essex and the Test and County Cricket Board resulted in no action being taken against any person or team.

    In 2000 the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) passed the Topley papers to the Greater Manchester Police. They concluded that no police action was warranted. Subsequently the ECB announced that there was insufficient evidence against any individual falling under the Boards jurisdiction to bring a case before a discipline panel.

    Sri Lanka 1994 – Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka
    Early in 1994, following a tour in India, the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka ordered an Inquiry into the national team's poor performance. The tour had resulted in all three Tests being lost by an innings. The report concluded, "There is evidence that a bookmaker of Indian origin has attempted to make his presence felt in the national cricket scene".

    Australia 1995 – Australian Cricket Board
    In September 1994, during the Singer Cup in Sri Lanka, Mark Waugh and Shane Warne accepted $4,000 and $5,000 respectively from 'John', an Indian bookmaker, to provide him with weather and pitch information in games involving Australia.

    Waugh declined to provide details concerning team tactics or selection of players but provided information to 'John' on approximately ten occasions over a five month period. This included games in Pakistan, Australia during the 1994/95 Ashes tour, in New Zealand in February 1995 and finally in the West Indies during the tour in 1995. the full scope of Waugh's telephone calls were not fully appreciated until further examination during the O'Regan Inquiry.

    John gave Warne, who had been introduced to Waugh, an envelope containing $5,000 as a token of his appreciation for meeting him. Warne was subsequently phoned by John on three occasions during the Ashes series in Australia 1994/95 and he responded in quite general terms to queries about the composition of the team and the likely state of the pitch for certain matches.

    These arrangements came to an end when a journalist contacted Ian McDonald, the Australian Team Manager. Waugh and Warne provided McDonald with handwritten, but unsigned statements (dated 20 February 1995) concerning the acceptance of money from 'John'. After a further interview with ACB officials, when both men again made admissions, Waugh was fined $AUS 10,000 and Warne $AUS 8,000.

    Other than a reference to the incident in the Minutes of the ACB meeting of 28 February 1995, no mention of this incident was made public until 1998. This would accord with the then feelings of the ICC that, in the best interests of cricket, such matters should not be released into the public domain. This incident is referred to in the O'Regan Report.

    Pakistan 1995 – Justice (Retd) Fakhruddin G Ibrahim
    In 1995 the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) initiated an Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Justice Fakhruddin G Ibrahim, a former judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court, to look into allegations made by Australian players surrounding the First Test between Pakistan and Australia in Karachi in 1994 and the ODI in Rawalpindi

    Some months after the game a newspaper carried an article alleging that Salim Malik had offered three Australian players (Shane Warne, Mark Waugh and Tim May) $200,000 to manipulate the result during the last day of the fixture. Waugh also alleged that Malik offered him $200,000 for four or five Australian players to under- perform in the next days ODI in Rawalpindi.

    The Inquiry was frustrated as the Australian players did not travel to Pakistan to give evidence, and thus the Inquiry had to rely on their statements together with the cross examination of Malik.

    In February 1995 the International Cricket Council urged the Pakistan Cricket Board to be discreet "always bearing in mind the damage to the image of cricket if allegations were made public in any way".

    In October 1995 Judge Ibrahim concluded the proceedings by saying "The allegations against Saleem (sic) Malik are not worthy of any credence and must be rejected as unfounded".

    These allegations were re-examined during the O'Regan and Qayyum Inquiries.

    India 1997 – Chandrachund Inquiry
    In 1997, following revelations in 'Outlook' magazine, the Honourable Shri Justice Y. V. Chandrachud was appointed as a One Man Committee (Chandrachud Committee) by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) to hold an Inquiry into the alleged charges of betting and match fixing by Indian cricketers and/or by the management.

    The article alleged that Manoj Prabhakar had been offered Rs. 25 lakhs (approx $53,000 at current Indian Rupee/US dollar rate) by an Indian team member to under- perform during the 1994 Singer Cup match between India and Pakistan so as to favour Pakistan.

    In November 1997 Justice Chandrachud, concluded his investigation. Whilst he accepted that large scale betting occurred in India he was unwilling to accept, upon the information provided to him, that there was proof that any Indian player, official or journalist had ever involved themselves in such a form of activity. This internal Inquiry was not to become public for some two and a half years.

    Australia 1998 – O'Regan Inquiry
    In 1998 after the 1994/95 Waugh and Warne allegations were revealed by the media, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) faced criticism of the handling of the affair. It responded by appointing Rob O'Regan AM QC to conduct a full investigation covering the period January 1992 to December 1998. His brief was to:

    • Investigate whether any of its contracted players had engaged in certain conduct relating to betting, bribery, match-fixing, the unauthorised receipt of moneys or other benefits and related matters, and to investigate also disciplinary processes available for consideration of such conduct.

    As his was a private ACB Inquiry, O'Regan did not have the powers conferred by statute to compel witnesses to give evidence on oath or affirmation, nor could he even require them to give evidence at all. The Inquiry did not enjoy the protection of absolute privilege, such as would provide a complete defence against an action in defamation.

    O'Regan concentrated his examination on the events surrounding Australian players in respect of:

    • Alleged approach to Dean Jones during 1992 in Sri Lanka.
    • Allegation that the second match of the 1992 World XI v Indian XI was fixed.
    • Allegations that Allan Border was approached to fix the final Test of the 1993 Australian tour of England.
    • The acceptance of $4,000 and $5,000 by Mark Waugh and Shane Warne during the 1994 Sri Lanka/Pakistan Tour
    • Alleged approach to Ricky Ponting for match information during 1997
    • Alleged approach to Mark Taylor regarding weather and pitch information during the 1998 Pakistan tour.

    After a thorough investigation O'Regan formed the opinion that there was no basis for recommending disciplinary action against any Australian player, Waugh and Warne having previously been fined in 1995. However he did criticise the ACB for its handling of the Waugh/Warne case believing that they should have been suspended.

    He recommended that the ACB review the way in which it dealt with serious disciplinary proceedings, publicity of such proceedings, penalties to be imposed and player counselling in relation to untoward contact with those with gambling interests.

    Some of the events mentioned in the O'Regan report were later to be corroborated by the Indian bookmaker MK Gupta, when he was interviewed by the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation in 2000 during the Hansie Cronjé affair. However the evidence of Gupta made a new allegation of corruption against one Australian player. This allegation is currently the subject of an investigation by the Special Investigator appointed by the ACB, with assistance from the ICC ACU.

    Pakistan 1998 – Qayyum Inquiry
    In 1998, under the terms of the Commission of Inquiry Act 1956, Pakistan set up a one man Judicial Commission to probe allegations that members of the National team had been involved in betting and match fixing. Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Qayyum was appointed to the Commission.

    This was to follow the Inquiry undertaken by Justice (Retd.) Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim and a Probe Committee Inquiry chaired by Justice Ejaz Yousef (Yousef Inquiry). The Yousef Inquiry, which did not have the powers of a Judge to compel witnesses to give evidence, was undertaken ex-parte and no opportunity was given to the accused to be represented or cross-examine witnesses. Whilst the Yousef Inquiry was abandoned, as it was felt that the process was flawed, it had tentatively suggested that certain players be suspended from playing cricket.

    Justice Qayyum decided that rules of natural justice such as hearing and right of cross-examination must be applied.

    The Commission's mandate was:

    • To probe into the allegations regarding betting and match fixing against the members of the Pakistan Cricket Team.
    • To determine and identify the persons including members of the team responsible for betting and match fixing.
    • To recommend such actions as may be appropriate; and
    • To suggest measures to avoid any future incidence.

    The term 'match-fixing' was defined as:

    • Deciding the outcome of a match before it is played and then playing oneself or having others play below one's/their ability to influence the outcome to be in accordance with the pre-decided outcome. Match fixing was undertaken primarily for pecuniary gain.

    As Justice Qayyum considered that the appropriate punishments for match-fixing was a ban he required the burden of proof to lie between that applied to the criminal and normal civil standard, i.e. a higher standard of proof than the balance of probabilities.

    Two offences were considered:

    • Match-fixing
    • Bringing the name of the team into disrepute (match-fixing related)

    The Commission examined cricketers from Pakistan and Australia, Sports Journalists and miscellaneous other witnesses, and heard evidence containing fact and conjecture relating to incidents of alleged betting and match fixing. Whilst many events were related, it soon became apparent that Salim Malik was the focal point of many of the allegations.

    Amongst those who appeared to give evidence were Mark Waugh and Mark Taylor. They gave evidence of an approach by Malik shortly before the Wills Triangular Series ODI in Rawalpindi on 22 October 1994 when Malik sought out Waugh to enquire if he could influence the Australian team in throwing the match.

    However, whilst not specifically asked about it, they did not mention the undisclosed ACB 1995 finding that Waugh and Warne had accepted money from an Indian bookmaker, a fact to which Taylor had also been privy. This was revealed in December 1998, after they had given evidence before Justice Qayyum. As a direct result of this disclosure the Qayyum Inquiry travelled to Australia, where a special hearing having been convened under Pakistan law, they heard from Waugh and Warne.

    Although completed many months earlier, and submitted to the PCB, Justice Qayyums report was not published until after the publicity surrounding the revelations about Cronjè.

    In the report he concluded "The allegation that the Pakistan team as a whole is involved in match-fixing is just based on allegation, conjectures and surmises without there being positive proof. As a whole, the players of the Pakistan Cricket team are innocent".

    However he found that the evidence in the case of Salim Malik was such that he should be banned from cricket for life and that there should be an inquiry into his assets. He further recommended that Ata-ur-Rehman should be similarly banned for life. Additionally Wasim Akram, Mushtaq Ahmed, Waqar Younis, Inzamam-ul-Haq, Akram Raza, Basit Ali and Saeed Anwar were subject of various penalties including being warned, censured, further investigated or kept under observation. He also recommended that the captaincy of the Pakistan Cricket team be removed from Wasim Akram.

    He also imposed fines of varying amounts as follows: Salim Malik Rs. 10 lac Wasim Akram Rs. 3 lac Mushtaq Ahmad Rs. 3 lac Ata-ur-Rehman Rs. 1 lac Waqar Younis Rs. 1 lac Inzamam-ul-Haq Rs. 1 lac Akram Raza Rs. 1 lac Saeed Anwar Rs. 1 lac

    At the current Rupee/US Dollar exchange rate, one 1 Lac (100,000 Pakistan Rupees) equates to approximately $ 1,640.

    Justice Qayyum considered that the PCB should enforce declarations of assets by all its players and, if necessary, initiate a probe into their accounts. A watchdog Review Committee should be formed to deal with any future allegations.

    A series of recommendations were made to prevent match fixing in the future. They can be summarised as covering areas surrounding,

    • The character of the team Manager and Captain
    • Independent team ombudsman of foreign tours
    • A new code of conduct
    • Increase in players pay and conditions
    • Education of players concerning entrapment by bookmakers
    • Enforcement of strict discipline with a zero tolerance approach
    • Review of match venues
    • Players' relations with the press and match day restrictions

    England 1999 – Metropolitan Police investigation
    In late July 1999 Stephen Fleming, the New Zealand Captain, was approached in his hotel in Leicester, UK by two Indian nationals who allegedly propositioned him to 'fix' the 3rd Test between England and New Zealand due to take place at Old Trafford, Manchester on 5th August. He rejected the proposition and reported the matter to his Team Manager.

    A day or so later Chris Lewis, the former England international, was similarly approached by two Indian nationals with a view to him arranging to 'fix' the 3rd Test or alternatively future matches involving the England team. He rejected the offer and the incident was reported to the England and Wales Cricket Board and the Metropolitan Police, London. A criminal investigation was initiated and police interviewed various people alleged to be involved in the corrupt approach. During the course of enquiries the Metropolitan Police have liaised with the New Delhi Police, CBI and the King Commission in developing links between the various allegations of corruption.

    The result of the investigation has been passed to the UK judicial authorities for consideration.

    India 2000 – New Delhi Police investigation
    In April 2000, whilst investigating an unrelated matter, New Delhi Police were monitoring the telephone calls of an Indian national. They overheard a telephone conversation in which Hansie Cronjé was mentioned, and subsequently listened to him discussing match fixing.

    The New Delhi Police launched an investigation centred on the association between Cronjé (and South African players), London based businessman Sanjay Chawla and two Indian bookmakers. In May 2000 the New Delhi Police charged Cronjé, Strydom, Gibbs and Bojé, in their absence, with cheating, fraud and criminal conspiracy.

    India 2000 – CBI Report
    Following the investigation by the New Delhi Police, which revealed that Cronjé had taken money from Indian bookmakers the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) instigated an inquiry.

    Unlike previous inquiries, the CBI (whose investigations commenced in May 2000) actively sought out evidence, in contrast to hearing witnesses in a formal enquiry. They also utilised itemised telephone billing to prove associations. The CBI decided that first of all a broad enquiry was to be made to ascertain whether match fixing and other malpractices connected with the game of cricket existed. Accordingly, the following were fixed as focal points:
    The CBI focused on the following:

    • Identification of the betting syndicates operating in India and examine their activities.
    • Unraveling of the linkages of cricket players or their intermediaries with these syndicates and their roles in the alleged malpractices; and
    • Examination of the role and functions of Board of Control for Cricket in India so as to evaluate whether it could have prevented the alleged malpractices.

    The CBI, like Qayyum, provided a definition of match fixing, which they interpreted as:

    • Instances where an individual player or group of players received money individually/collectively to under-perform;
    • Instances where a player placed bets in matches in which he played that would naturally undermine his performance;
    • Instances where players passed on information to a betting syndicate about team composition, probable result, pitch condition, weather, etc.,
    • Instances where grounds men were given money to prepare a pitch in a way which suited the betting syndicate; and

    Instances of current and ex-players being used by bookies to gain access to Indian and foreign players to influence their performance for a monetary consideration.

    The revelations about Cronjé, which will be referred to within the section relating to the King Commission, ultimately led to Mukesh Kumar Gupta (also known as MK and John), an Indian bookmaker. Gupta, who was one of many bookmakers and gamblers interviewed by the CBI, was the only one to admit to corrupting cricket players of various countries. He alleged he had paid players significant amounts of money for under-performing and match information

    The investigation found that MK Gupta had become involved in illegal betting in the 1980's and in 1988 paid Ajay Sharma 2,000 rupees, having watched him play, as a token of his appreciation. Subsequently through Sharma, and later Manoj Prabhakar, Gupta alleged that he met many Indian and foreign international players. He gave evidence of large-scale corruption involving, amongst others, Azharuddin and Cronjé. He also named several non Indian players and alleged that they had been involved in cricket malpractice. The CBI did not have the jurisdiction to investigate the non- Indian players and although they named them in their report they did not carry out any investigation into these allegations.

    After collecting evidence from players, officials, bookmakers, gamblers and others, the CBI commented that " At the very outset that the cricketing fraternity, generally speaking, maintained a 'conspiracy of silence' and were rarely forthcoming with any specific information relevant to the enquiry. Not a single player/ex-player/official etc., other than those who had made vague and general allegations in the media, volunteered any information to the CBI".

    The CBI Report, published in November 2000, implicated Indian players, and officials, and non-Indian players. It also criticised the BCCI. The Solicitor General of India was in broad agreement with the findings of the CBI that no criminal charges could be filed against anyone.

    The CBI criticised the Board of Control for Cricket in India for being negligent in response to allegations of match fixing and also criticised its structure and accountability. The Board has challenged these criticisms.

    Following publication of the CBI Report the BCCI appointed Mr K. Madhaven to review the finding of the report and conduct inquiries on behalf of the BCCI with regard to Indian players and officials. On 5 December 2000, after Mr Madhaven had submitted his findings, the BCCI banned Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma for life from playing any cricket matches conducted or authorised by the ICC/BCCI or affiliated association. Manoj Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and Dr Ali Irani were banned for 5 years in similar terms.

    The CBI Report concluded that whilst small scale betting on cricket matches had been taking place in India for a long time, the advent of live television broadcasts led to an upswing in large scale betting. This coincided with India's victory in the 1983 World Cup. The CBI linked the current sophisticated nature and monetary scale of betting in India to organised crime with clear signals of 'Mafia' underworld involvement.

    South Africa 2000 – King Commission
    Following the Cronjé revelations, and his subsequent confession to officials of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB), the authorities set up an Inquiry chaired by Judge Edwin King.

    The Commission was established by the President of South Africa in terms of Section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (Act No 108 of 1996) as a Commission of Inquiry into Cricket Match Fixing and Related Matters (commonly referred to as the King Commission).

    The Terms of Reference for the preliminary investigation were:

    A.1. The disclosures made by the former South African cricket captain, Hansie Cronjé, that during the Triangular Tournament between South Africa, England and Zimbabwe in January and February 2000, he received payment of approximately $10,000-00 from a bookmaker.

    A.2. Whether during the period 1 November 1999 – 17 April 2000, and excluding the matters referred to in paragraph 1, any member of the South African cricket team or team official received or was promised payment of any amount of money or other benefit (excluding salary, emoluments, sponsorship and other payments or benefits lawfully connected therewith) in relation to his or her functions as a member of the South African cricket team or as a team official.

    A.3. Whether a proposal was made to the South African cricket team during its tour to India in 1996 that it forfeit or otherwise influence the result of a cricket match.

    The Commission heard that on 7th April 2000 the UCB first became aware of allegations that Hansie Cronjé had been involved in match fixing, although it did not define its interpretation of match fixing. After initial denials to the UCB, Cronjé confessed to accepting money from bookmaker Sanjay Chawla for involvement in cricket malpractice involving the South African Team. Cronjè had been introduced to Chawla by South African based bookmaker Hamid Cassim.

    The evidence revealed that Cronjé had approached several South African players in an apparently light hearted and jocular manner suggesting that money could be made by fixing the results of games. This was his way of sounding out his colleagues. In the main this was laughed off, but Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams were later to be embroiled in Cronjé's corruption.

    During the CBI investigation Azharuddin had admitted that in December 1996 he had introduced Cronjé to the bookmaker M K Gupta during the South African tour to India. Gupta immediately propositioned Cronjé, who accepted $30,000 to ensure that South Africa lost the Third Test commencing the following day. Cronjé stated that he had subsequently done nothing to influence the outcome of this match, which India won.

    About the same time Gupta made an offer to Cronjé for South Africa to lose a One Day International, initially being played for the benefit of Mohinder Amarnath, but subsequently converted into an official international match.

    Cronjé approached several members of the South African Team and mentioned that he had received the offer that was dependant on the team playing badly in the ODI. The offer was reportedly in the region of $200,000 – $250,000 and Cronjé was later to indicate that the offer had been raised by $100,000. Following meetings, involving senior members and the team as a whole, the offer was rejected.

    Their relationship ended in November 1997 after Cronjé rejected Gupta's corrupt proposals during the quadrangular series.

    With Gupta off the scene it is alleged that in January 2000 Cronjé influenced the result of the 5th Test against England at Centurion Park. After the first days play, when South Africa was 155 for 6 at the close of play, days two, three and four had been affected by the weather. On the evening of the penultimate day's play Cronjé spoke to Marlon Aronstam, who was well versed in sports betting, who urged him to 'make a game of it'. On the last day it was agreed that South Africa would declare and leave England with a 'run race', a feat that they achieved. Aronstam had reportedly agreed to make a donation of R200,000 to a charity of Cronjé's choice (although Cronjé recalls the figure to be R500,000) if he could ensure a positive result for the fixture. At the current Rand/US Dollar exchange rate, R200,000 equates to approximately $24,000 and R500,000 to approximately $ 60,000.

    Aronstam also testified that he had paid Cronjé R50,000 as an advance for future cooperation in relation to pitch reports.

    The UCB subsequently banned Cronjé for life. On 28 August 2000 Gibbs and Williams were banned from international cricket for six months (ending 1 January 2001) and fined R60,000 and R10,000 respectively for accepting a $15,000 bribe offered by Cronjé to under-perform in an ODI at Nagpur earlier that year. However Gibbs and Williams were permitted to continue playing domestic cricket.

    The First Interim Report of the Commission detailing the evidence of Cronjé was published in August 2000.

    One of the Commission's duties was to make recommendations concerning the various matters falling within its mandate.

    On 14 December 2000, although his work continued, Judge King completed his second Interim Report with his recommendations. These fell under the broad headings of:

    Education and Training

    • Control and Supervision
    • Financial Security
    • Governance
    • Punishment and Sanctions

    United Arab Emirates 2001
    Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates had been mentioned during various Inquiries as a venue where match fixing occurred. In January 2001 the Emirates Cricket Board commissioned a private Inquiry, under the chairmanship of the George W Staple CB QC, to examine allegations that directly impinged upon Sharjah as a venue. The Commission of Inquiry, which also included the former West Indian Captain Clive Lloyd and Brigadier Mohammed K Al Mualla, submitted its confidential interim report to the Emirates Cricket Board in April 2001.

    This document, whilst giving the reader a flavour of the various Inquiries and Reports, does not pretend to encompass all matters that were subject of inquiry or investigation. Full copies of the Reports may be found at the following web site addresses:

    O'Regan Report

    Qayyum Inquiry Report

    CBI Report

    King Commission Report – 1st Interim

    King Commission Report – 2nd Interim

    The table at Appendix 'C' provides details of matches mentioned by players, administrators, team officials, journalists or bookmakers during the CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K) inquiries in India, Pakistan and South Africa.

    Whilst the above information has been compiled from a variety of sources, assistance and copyright material provided by Wisden Cricketers' Almanack and CricInfo is gratefully acknowledged.

    Appendix 'C'


    The following matches were mentioned by players, administrators, team officials, journalists or bookmakers during the CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K) inquiries in India, Pakistan and South Africa. Inclusion on this list does not necessarily indicate that a match was fixed.

    Season Match Venue Type See Wisden Inquiry
    1979-80 India v Pakistan Calcutta Test 1981 p. 1012 CBI, Q
    1987-88 *Australia v Pakistan Lahore one-day 1988 p. 283 Q
    1990-91 Delhi v Bombay Delhi Ranji 1992 p. 1160 CBI
    1991-92 Wills XI v Habib Bank Delhi one-day CBI
    Two India games in B&H World Series in Australia CBI
    1992 England v Pakistan Nottingham one-day 1993 p. 303 Q
    1992-93 India v England Calcutta Test 1994 p. 972 CBI
    India v England Bangalore one-day 1994 p. 978 CBI
    India v England Gwalior one-day 1994 p. 980 CBI
    India v England Gwalior one-day 1994 p. 981 CBI
    1993-94 India v Sri Lanka Lucknow Test 1995 p. 1091 CBI
    New Zealand v Pakistan Christchurch Test 1995 p. 1107 Q
    New Zealand v Pakistan Christchurch one-day 1995 p. 1112 Q
    India v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 1995 p. 1172 Q
    1994-95 Australia v Pakistan Colombo one-day 1996 p. 1138 CBI, Q
    Sri Lanka v India Colombo one-day 1996 p. 1141 CBI
    Pakistan v Australia Karachi Test 1996 p. 1030 Q
    Pakistan v Australia Rawalpindi one-day 1996 p. 1147 Q
    India v West Indies Kanpur one-day 1996 p. 1152 CBI
    South Africa v Pakistan Cape Town one-day 1996 p. 1177 K, Q
    South Africa v Pakistan Johannesburg one-day 1996 p. 1178 K, Q
    1995-96 *India v Pakistan Bangalore one-day 1997 p. 1043 Q
    Pakistan v Sri Lanka Singapore one-day 1997 p. 1175 Q
    1996-97 India v Australia Delhi Test 1998 p. 1037 CBI

    India v South Africa

    Rajkot one-day 1998 p. 1156 CBI
    India v South Africa Mumbai one-day 1998 p. 1158 CBI
    India v South Africa Ahmedabad Test 1998 p. 1049 CBI
    India v South Africa Calcutta Test 1998 p. 1050 CBI
    India v South Africa Mumbai one-day 1998 p. 1054 CBI, K
    South Africa v India Durban Test 1998 p. 1081 K
    South Africa v India Cape Town Test 1998 p. 1082 K
    South Africa v India Johannesburg Test 1998 p. 1084 CBI, K
    West kIndies v India Barbados Test 1998 p. 1118 CBI
    1997-98 Sri Lanka v Pakistan Colombo one-day 1999 p. 1171 CBI, Q
    Sahara Cup Toronto one-day 1999 p. 1176 CBI, Q
    Pakistan v India Karachi one-day 1999 p. 1182 Q
    Pakistan v South Africa Faisalabad Test 1999 p. 1083 Q
    Pakistan v Sri Lanka Lahore one-day 1999 p. 1194 Q
    England v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 1999 p. 1212 Q
    India v New Zealand Sharjah one-day 1999 p. 1240 CBI
    1998 England v South Africa Leeds Test 1999 p. 411 K
    1998-99 India v Pakistan Jaipur one-day 2000 p. 1281 CBI
    England v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 2000 p. 1289 Q
    1999 *India v Zimbabwe Leicester one-day 2000 p. 445 CBI
    *Bangladesh v Pakistan Northampton one-day 2000 p. 471 K, Q
    *India v Pakistan Manchester one-day 2000 p. 478 K, Q
    1999-2000 Challenger Series between India, India A and India B CBI
    India v New Zealand Ahmedabad Test 2001 p. 1113 CBI
    South Africa v England Centurion Test 2001 p. 1077 K
    One-day series between South Africa, England and Zimbabwe K
    India v South Africa Mumbai Test 2001 p. 1196 K
    India v South Africa Bangalore Test 2001 p. 1198 K
    India v South Africa Nagpur one-day 2001 p. 1202 K
    * World Cup match.
    Reproduced from Wisden Cricketers' Almanack 2001 by kind permission of John Wisden & Co Ltd.

    © ICC 2001 

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